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Abstract
Icelandic culture has generally been considered to share many similarities to 
the Nordic cultures. However, the financial crisis in 2008 painted a completely 
different picture, with the Nordic nations faring much less worse than Iceland, 
which saw its banking system becoming almost entirely worthless. Looking at 
traditional cultural yardsticks in the vein of  the most commonly used research 
in the field of  business and organizational management, generally linked to 
Hofstede´s dimensional studies, one would at first glance conclude that 
Icelanders would have behaved in a similar manner as people in the Nordic 
nations. By focusing on savings ratio, it is shown that Icelanders were much more 
risk-seeking during the prelude of  the crisis. Many nations badly hit during the 
2008 financial crisis have a high level of  individualism inherent in their culture. 
Iceland fits this scenario. Thus while general cultural characteristics may lack 
explanatory power regarding economic behavior of  people between cultures, 
the individual/collective cultural dimension may provide clues of  what dangers 
(and possible strengths) lurk within societies from a financial point of  view. 
Such developments may affect the financial stability of  nations, especially those 
with a high level of  individualism where financial liberalization with possible 
abuses is occurring.
Keywords: Behavioral economics; financial crises; Hofstede; individualism; 
Iceland.
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Icelanders are generally considered to be culturally similar to other Nordic nations re-
garding, for example, personal traits, institutional systems and visible cultural artefacts 
(Vaiman et al. 2010), while also showing significant American characteristics (Olafsson 
2003). All the Nordic nations are known for established welfare states, similar languages 
(Finland is the exception), religion and an intertwined history. Although they suffered 
major blows during the financial crisis that crushed large parts of  the world´s economy 
in 2008, Iceland stood out in terms of  losses. Almost the entire banking system in Ice-
land went into receivership during the first two weeks of  October of  2008, with credit 
losses estimated to be in the region of  Iceland´s annual total Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), fourfold (Zoega 2010). Sigurjonsson and Mixa (2011) showed that the growth 
of  the Icelandic banking system was much more reckless in the prelude to the 2008 crisis 
than the growth among other Nordic banks preceding the major banking crisis during 
the early 1990s, paving the way for historical losses. 
The massive difference raises questions why Iceland suffered a much worse fate than 
its Nordic counterparts in view of  the assumed cultural similarities. The assumption that 
Nordic financial institutions had simply learned from their early 1990s banking crisis is a 
weak argument, since the Icelandic government had to inject a similar percentage of  the 
nation´s GDP into the banking system during the same period (Gylfason 2011).
Recent research in Iceland has, in an indirect way, shed light on factors indicating that 
certain socio-cultural conditions during the period preceding the 2008 crash may have 
influenced why Iceland stood out, particularly by creating a banking system with such 
speed that it was vulnerable to any sort of  domestic or international financial difficulties. 
Part of  that research is mainly built upon Geert Hofstede´s methods in investigating 
certain characteristics of  national cultures, which are often referred to as dimensional 
studies. Such studies have been used extensively in the field of  management and busi-
ness by many scholars in other national contexts (Newman & Nollen 1996; Soares, 
Farhangmehr & Shoham 2007; Hoffman & Hegarty 1993). 
When viewing the general results of  Hofstede’s dimensional studies, it appears that 
they break down when inspecting Icelandic behavior from a financial standpoint. The 
different financial behavior of  Icelanders compared to other Nordic nations was al-
ready apparent during the mid-1990s, but the divergence gathered considerable strength 
during the early 2000s. However, this divergence may be less surprising when taking a 
closer look at comparison studies of  the Nordic nations. Smith et al. (2003, 492) showed 
that while the Nordic nations had a common distinctive cultural profile, the authors 
point out possible differences when reviewing management styles between those na-
tions (494), more so than prior literature might have led them to expect. 
In this paper we use Smith´s et al. approach of  looking closely at certain cultural dif-
ferences, but instead of  focusing on management style, we focus on financial indicators 
and their potential in inferring possible cultural differences. We show that while Nordic 
nations appear on the surface to share similar cultural traits, financial data indicates Ice-
landers being more risk-oriented. By stressing financial data, our discussion can be lo-
cated within cultural economics - a research area that views financial behavior not purely 
from a singular psychological perspective but is also built upon the assumption that 
financial behavior is shaped by wider historical and economic contexts and may differ 
between cultures, even those that on the surface may seem similar. This method enables 
us to analyze Hofstede´s application, its possible weaknesses but also its possibilities. 
We begin by providing a short overview of  general perceptions of  Icelandic culture, 
showing that while cultural similarities exist between Iceland and the other Nordic na-
tions, there still remain distinct differences. We then provide an overview of  cultural 
economics and then again compare Iceland to certain Nordic nations using financial 
data to show different indications of  cultural behavior. We focus on recent dimensional 
studies done by Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir and Gudlaugsson (AGG) published in 
2011 and 2015 and we provide possible explanations of  why the nation was, in a sense, 
ready to embrace new sets of  cultural values. This discussion focuses on the individual-
ism dimension. We also discuss other factors that influenced and were intertwined with 
changing the Icelandic nation´s values and perspective in such a dramatic way. They 
include the institutional changes that were occurring in Iceland during the mid-1990s 
within the financial sector, a paradigm shift in political ideologies, and all this taking 
place at the same time as a technological revolution in communication changed the 
world view of  the Icelandic nation. These combined elements created a perfect finan-
cial storm that could show its force at any given moment. We argue that such cultural 
elements differed in Iceland compared to other Nordic nations, and this explains, to a 
certain degree, why Iceland was harder hit by the financial crisis in 2008 than the other 
Nordic nations.
1. Icelandic culture comparisons
A common way of  measuring cultural differences is dimensional studies, which are usu-
ally attributed to Geert Hofstede. Hofstede´s methodology compares certain dimen-
sions between nations on a relative scale. This method has been used extensively in the 
field of  management and business by many scholars. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 
define culture as being a shared system of  meanings, dictating what we pay attention 
to, how we act and what we value (1998, 13). That definition is often used as a prelude 
of  Hofstede´s et al. (2011, 6) definition; “Culture is the collective programming of  the 
mind that distinguishes the members of  one group or category of  people from oth-
ers.” Both parties define culture as being in layers from which external observations of  
culture are observed towards more unobservable aspects that are more inherent values. 
 Hofstede’s methods have been criticized by numerous researchers (Ailon 2008; Mc-
Sweeney 2002) but nevertheless remain the most popular method in studying cross-
national cultures within financial analysis (Breuer & Quinten 2009; Magnusson et al. 
2008; Reuter 2010), with no obvious alternatives (Jones 2007). Hofstede’s dimensions 
in comparing different cultural differences are grouped into five categories: 1) Power 
Distance (PDI), which measures the extent to which members with less power within 











Individualism (versus Collectivism) (IDV), which refers to societies where ties between 
individuals are loose as opposed to other ones where people place a more emphasis on 
strong and cohesive in-groups; 3) Masculinity versus Femininity (MAS), a dimension 
relating to gender roles of  various types; 4) Uncertainty – Avoidance (UAI), a scaled 
level of  members’ inclination to avoid or feel threatened by unknown situations and 
thus inclinations of  having a structured life; 5) Long-term versus Short-term Orienta-
tion (LTO), which is an indicator for the emphasis on future, as opposed to immediate, 
rewards, especially concerning actions of  perseverance and thrift.  
Only a few studies relying on Hofstede’s research have been conducted in Iceland, 
with the Hofstede database website stating that Iceland´s scores are merely, “based on 
an educated guess derived from data representing similar countries in combination with 
our practitioner experience” (Hofstede Centre 2015). In 1997, Eyjolfsdottir and Smith 
examined the Icelandic pattern of  business and management relating to Iceland’s cul-
ture, relying mainly upon a questionnaire study, from which they developed an analysis 
using Hofstede’s concepts. No numeric scores were provided, but nevertheless gen-
eral conclusions were made. Their findings of  Icelandic management culture suggest 
similarities to other Nordic nations, with Icelandic managers in general resembling their 
Nordic counterparts with low power distance, low uncertainty avoidance and holding 
feminine values. The individualism findings indicated, however, that Icelandic managers 
were more individualistic than their Nordic counterparts and actually similar to other 
nations where the highest scores in the world were recorded, such as the United States, 
the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom (67). Although the Long-
term dimension was not set up in conjunction with Hofstede’s research - it had recently 
been added when that study was done, therefore, Eyjolfsdottir and Smith were probably 
not aware of  it during the writing of  the paper - a great deal is spent on inferring such 
practices, drawing upon Trompeaars and Hampden-Turner’s dimension of  time and 
emphasis on short- versus long-term results. Their conclusion is that Icelandic managers 
concentrate on short-term results, having “a fisherman’s mentality” of  dealing with an 
unstable environment (69-70).
H.P. Jonsson used the Hofstede questionnaire (2004) to compare one company and 
one institution in Iceland to other comparable ones in the Nordic nations. The general 
results were that Icelanders are culturally similar to Nordic nations. However, the find-
ings showed that Icelanders had more power distance, slightly more individualism, their 
masculinity was in the higher range, and Icelanders had the highest uncertainty avoid-
ance and long-term orientation of  the Nordic nations (LTO was not measured for Den-
mark and Finland). It should be noted that while the Icelandic stock market had recently 
given fantastic returns when the study was done, many Icelanders at that point were still 
licking their wounds from dot.com investments, in particular relating to enormous loss-
es related to the bio-technological company deCODE genetics. The result of  the study 
outlined above, particularly regarding individualism, is similar to Geert Hofstede’s own 
estimates (long-term orientation not included) when he was interviewed by Vlad Vaiman 
in 2009 (Vaiman, Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 2010). However, Hofstede estimated lower 
scores in the other dimensions. 
The first Icelandic systematic comparison study in the dimensional manner was con-
ducted in 2009 by Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson (AGG) (2011). Ac-
cording to their results, Icelandic culture entails a low power distance, high feminine 
values and average long-term orientation compared to other Nordic nations. It is inter-
esting that the uncertainty avoidance dimension is relatively high within the Icelandic 
culture. AGG point out that the uncertainty avoidance dimension may be influenced by 
the recent financial crash, and related financial losses the Icelandic nation had endured 
(360). The main distinct result relates to individualism. Iceland not only scored higher 
than the Nordic nations regarding individualism but, as AGG point out in their first 
study, is the first nation since Hofstede’s measurements began in 1980 to score higher 
than the United States. 
A follow-up study by the same authors was conducted in 2013, which analyzed its re-
sults from various perspectives (Gudmundsdottir, Gudlaugsson & Adalsteinsson 2015). 
The general results were similar to their previous study. Figure 1 shows the scores for 
the Nordic nations compared to Iceland, according to the Hofstede database, using the 
average scores from the two AGG studies.
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Sources: Hofstede database (2015), Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson (2011) and Gudmundsdottir, 
Gudlaugsson & Adalsteinsson (2015).
In conjunction with their follow-up study in 2014, AGG compared Iceland to 25 other 
OECD nations and clustered them into groups, depending on similarities of  cultural 











without Iceland, which differed from those nations particularly regarding its high indi-
vidualism. Iceland was instead clustered with Canada, New Zealand, the United King-
dom, Australia and the United States. This strongly indicates that Iceland should not 
automatically be culturally lumped with other Nordic nations, despite having some simi-
lar cultural characteristics. One can thus conclude from these results that while the com-
mon perception of  Icelandic culture being similar to Nordic cultures is not necessarily 
incorrect, Icelandic culture exhibits clear patterns of  dissimilarity. 
What is specifically interesting is the high association with individualism. Four of  the 
five nations grouped with Iceland have the highest individualism score in Hofstede´s 
database, with Iceland rounding up the top 5 group. The final nation grouped with 
Iceland, New Zealand, has the eighth highest individualism score. This seems to be in 
accord with a perception of  American influences with more individualistic values as 
Olafsson (2003) proposes in his paper. There are four nations that have by far the high-
est scores as seen in Figure 2, with Icelandic data being the average scores from the two 
AGG studies.
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Sources:  Hofstede database (2015) and AGG (2011, 2015)
Does this individualistic trend have any implications? While the cause and effect regard-
ing financial matters may be scientifically impossible to prove, the high level of  individu-
alism may explain, to a certain degree, the financial behavior of  Icelanders. We show 
that the financial data largely corresponds to individualism, providing an explanation of  
cultural differences between Icelanders and their Nordic cousins, with Icelanders being 
more American as Olafsson (2003) infers. This methodology is in line with Hofstede´s 
et al. views, stating that dimensional studies should be first and foremost be used as 
some sort of  stepping stone in applications to other studies (2010, 48-49).
2. Cultural economics
Using financial indicators in relation to different cultures is a relatively new way of  
studying financial behavior and is generally labeled as cultural economics (while the term 
is often defined as cultural finance, we prefer using the broader term cultural economics, 
delimiting the term to acts of  investments). Cultural economics is conceptualized as be-
ing a bridge between a neoclassical point of  view of  finance and behavioral finance. It 
is assumed within the neoclassical ideology that market players are purely rational agents 
towards money and obey laws and regulations within parameters that provide no place 
for corruption (Cassidy 2009). In contrast, behavioral economics (often termed behav-
ioral finance), a study that has gained momentum since the early 1990s (Shiller 2001), 
analyzes more cognitive and emotional factors related to individual decision making, 
showing that people in certain circumstances act in ways that can be questioned as being 
rational regarding financial matters. Cultural economics takes this one step further by 
differentiating between such irrationalities as dependent upon cultural values, and even 
questions if  there is a singular ‘correct’ rationality but simply different core value sys-
tems that differ in what constitutes prudent uses of  money. These various approaches 
demonstrate the importance of  viewing finance from a multidisciplinary perspective.
A case in point is that behavioral economics generally take individuals raised in par-
ticular cultural environments as the norm, thus ignoring cultural aspects as important in 
shaping people’s behavior. The study of  behavioral economics generally assumes that 
what applies to individuals in one culture applies in the same manner in other cultures 
(at least to great extent). Hofstede (2010, 128) takes Adam Smith’s theory regarding the 
“invisible hand” as an example of  a generally world-wide accepted theory within the 
heart of  economics. Smith´s theory regarding the science of  economics is, however, 
based on an individualistic idea that has been mainly explored within nations that score 
highly on individualism, meaning that its applicability may differ between territories. 
The classic case of  the tragedy of  the commons may, for example, be more relevant in 
certain cultures than others. The notion of  individualism, as understood in behavioral 
economics, is not necessarily a universal phenomenon, but culturally a specific one, with 
duties and relations between individuals being different in various cultures. 
A common drawback of  Hofstede´s methods is that they are built upon surveys 
(Jones 2007) and thus mirror people´s perception of  themselves contrasted to others, 
but not necessarily their actual behavior. Opposed to surveys that provide clues about 
people’s perception of  themselves and their actions, the use of  money provides insights 
into how people actually act, since financial indicators reflect what individuals have al-
ready done in practice, although not revealing the underlying reasons. Here we use fi-
nancial data to determine differing behaviors between cultures. Such data has historically 
been used to determine various financial developments, mostly in regard to financial 
shocks and the explanatory use of  financial statistics in determining the causes and con-
sequences of  financial crises. Here we use it as a lens to get better insights into different 
financial behavior as it varies between nations.











economics standpoint, and then briefly show how financial behavior in Iceland has to 
be contextualized within the rapid cultural changes that have taken place globally for the 
last few decades. 
3. Economic and financial comparisons
Hofstede’s research has shown parallels between certain cultural traits and financial be-
havior (Hofstede et al. 2010). A high level of  individualism is, for example, most com-
mon in nations that are wealthy but GDP growth in nations with such cultural traits 
normally lags, in contrast with a common assumption that individualism creates high 
economic growth. Another example is how thrifty nations are, a cultural trait related to 
long-term orientation. Thrift, often associated with the percentage of  savings compared 
to income (commonly referred to as the savings ratio), has been associated with high 
long-term economic growth, although the data in recent years has not been conclusive 
(Hofstede et al. 2010, 262-267). We elaborate these insights by Hofstede and augment 
them by stressing the importance of  rapid cultural changes that have been largely ig-
nored by other dimensional scholars (Vaiman & Holden 2015).
3.1 Stocks and real estate
Sigurjonsson & Mixa (2011) compared Icelandic financial figures to ones in the Nordic 
nations (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark). The comparison periods were prel-
udes of  major financial crises, which in the Nordic nations took place from 1982 to 1991 
and in Iceland 17 years later, between the years 1999 to 2008.  The year 1982 was the 
starting point (or period 0 (zero)), for the Nordic nations and 1998 in Iceland. Those 
periods were then compared side by side. They concluded that Iceland had imitated all 
of  the main features of  the other nations listed above, but simply to a greater extent. 
This is, for example, vividly demonstrated by comparing the cumulative lending growth 
of  Icelandic banks to Nordic banks during the comparison periods as seen in Figure 
3. It should be noted that Icelandic banks differed from the Nordic banks in a funda-
mental way because much of  the lending among Icelandic banks was, in reality, vehicles 
to finance speculative purchases, even of  their own stock (Sigurjonsson & Mixa 2011). 
Increased lending was mostly related to real estate and the stock market in the Nordic 
nations (Jonung, Kiander & Vartia 2008, 21).
Figure 3. Cumulative lending growth comparisons with 1 as a base at period 0 – 
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Source: World Bank via Datamarket (2013)
A common indicator of  financial analysis in determining behavior within societies is 
measured with stock market indices and real estate prices, which mirror to a great extent 
pessimism and optimism within nations.  The growth of  the Icelandic stock market 
and rising real estate values from 2002 until the crash was historically unheard of. Dur-
ing these ‘Manic Millennium’ years (Mixa 2009) stocks multiplied in value more than 
sevenfold (OMX database 2012) while real estate prices increased threefold (Registers 
Iceland 2012). Stocks rose the same or more each year in Iceland over the years 2003 
(54%), 2004 (57%) and 2005 (60%) (OMX database 2012). This was a similar or greater 
rise than in 1933 (54%), which was the best year of  US stocks during the 20th century 
(Fridson 1998, vi-vii). However, that rise occurred after the Dow Jones stock index had 
fallen almost 90% in the previous 3 years. The remarkable rise is still almost dwarfed by 
the sudden fall in equity prices, with the Icelandic market practically wiped out in the 
fall of  2008 with the nation (literally) in a state of  shock. Even compared to the rise and 
fall of  other stock markets in the international arena, Iceland clearly stood out as shown 
in Figure 4, which compares the stock market index in Iceland to Nordic stock market 











Figure 4. Stock indices in Nordic nations with the base set at 1 at the beginning of 






























Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Iceland   
Source: Eurostat via Datamarket (2012)
Whatever the reasons for this divergence between Iceland and the Nordic nations (that 
were still by no means pessimistic), the difference in the euphoria in the stock market 
is staggering and does not harmonize with the results of  the general and dimensional 
studies comparing Iceland to Nordic nations. 
3.2 Savings ratio
The savings ratio is an indicator of  how thrifty nations are: it measures the percentage 
of  income that is set aside for the future as opposed to spending all income for more im-
mediate gratification. The ratio is measured by comparing the gross national savings to 
the percentage of  GDP. In other words, if  a nation produces goods and services valued 
at $100 per year and consumes $90 of  it, the remaining $10 are saved for the future and 
comprise 10% of  the GDP. Figure 5 compares the savings ratio between Nordic nations 
from 1995 until 2014.
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database (2015)
Figure 5 shows that Norway has saved between 20-40% of  its GDP during most of  the 
comparison period, and being as high as 30-40% during the 2000s. This high percent-
age is distorted though by the fact that its direct proceeds from oil profits are set into a 
specific investment fund, and with the rise in oil prices the figure has been very high dur-
ing the most recent decade. The other Scandinavian nations show similar savings ratios. 
Since all nations are relatively wealthy with socialized systems, the difference cannot be 
attributed to varying needs to save for a contingency fund.
While the Nordic nations began again to increase their savings ratio up to or above 
20% following the unwinding of  the banking crisis during the early 1990s, Iceland 
showed by far the least inclination to save money. The average savings ratio for Iceland 
during the 20 year period is 15%, or 10% lower than the average ratio of  the second 
lowest nations, Denmark and Finland. It is particularly interesting that the difference 
between the savings ratio between Iceland and the other Nordic nations begins steadily 
increasing after 1995 with the exception of  the period following the dot.com bust dur-
ing the beginning of  the Millennium, and the 2008 crash. 
When comparing the savings ratio between nations with high individualism scores 
to other nations, a clear pattern emerges. The higher the individualism score of  nations, 
the lower the savings ratio tends to be. By analyzing the savings ratio of  the four nations 
with the highest individualism score to the ones with the fifth to eighth highest score, 
the savings ratio is consistently lower among the highest individualism nations. When 
the savings ratio of  the top 8 individualism nations is further compared to other nations, 
in this instance the 18 additional nations used in the AGG study (2015) comparing Ice-
land to 25 other OECD nations, the results show again a negative correlation between 
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TOP 4 IDV TOP 5-8 IDV Other countries minus TOP 8 IDV 
Source:  IMF database (2015), Hofstede database (2015), AGG (2011) & (2015)
The difference is significant. The average savings ratio is 18% for the top 4 IDV nations, 
22% for the top 5-8 nations and 26% for the remaining nations. The savings ratio for 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are similar to the remaining nations, or 25%, 25% and 
28% respectively. It is interesting that this gap became the highest during the years both 
before and after the 2008 financial crisis. When looking at the savings ratio of  the top 4 
IDV nations, Australia stands out as having an average savings ratio of  22%. This is the 
same as the average of  the top 5-8 nations. Iceland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States have average ratios around 15%-18%, with Iceland´s numbers lowest. This is 
possibly due to the very low ratio during years the stock market was rising in an once-
in-a-lifetime manner, making people´s perception of  the need to save for a rainy day 
almost non-existent. The difference between savings ratios among the top four nations 
and other nations, especially those outside of  the top 8 individualism score, is constantly 
increasing from 2001. That coincides with the period following the effects of  more 
liquidity, with investment banks and commercial banks becoming ever more merged 
following the abolishment of  the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which had prevented such 
banking practices since 1933 in the wake of  the Great Depression. 
What is the cause of  this divergence? We propose that a sudden change of  values, 
a paradigm shift in worldviews, has occurred in Iceland to a much larger degree than in 
other Nordic nations, a change that may or may not be permanent. While no studies of  
general cultural Icelandic characteristics existed in a dimensional manner until recently, 
making systematic relative comparisons impossible, there are still numerous studies sug-
gesting that Icelanders have historically perceived themselves as individualistic in the 
past (Olafsson 2003; Eyjolfsdottir & Smith 1997; Matthiasdottir 2004). That notion 
was, however, still constantly in a tug of  war of  another notion of  holding on to past 
old-fashioned values (Matthiasdottir 2004, 361-362). This is reflected within the banking 
system in Iceland, which reflected a course towards a capitalistic (individualistic) modern 
society, but was yet dominated by centralized (collective) political monitoring (Loftsdot-
tir & Mixa 2014). That shift largely relates to Iceland’s more Americanized culture and 
high individualistic scores that took shape during the mid-1990s as we describe in the 
next chapter.
4. Contextualizing the cultural landscape
In their discussion on cross-cultural management, Vaiman & Holden (2015, 58) argue 
that the use of  nation as a proxy for culture is insufficient in providing explanations 
of  measurements of  values; other non-cultural issues also paradoxically play a part in 
shaping culture. As Magala (2015, 367) points out, cultures constantly evolve and the 
world has evolved dramatically since Hofstede´s initial research was published in 1980, 
when “neither Google, nor Facebook, nor Amazon.com were available to every owner 
of  a smart phone.” We believe that Icelandic culture has rapidly changed during the last 
two decades, to a great extent due to non-cultural issues that are related to changes in 
the political and financial landscape, enabled and caused partially by major technological 
changes in the communication sector.
Hofstede et al. (2010) point out that increasing individualism since the 1990s has 
been one of  the forces leading to deregulation, further stating that certain public mo-
nopolies have, in some cases, been replaced for ideological reasons rather than prag-
matic ones. This trend of  deregulation can be seen as a part of  the general process of  
neoliberalism, closely related to the neoclassical ideology. In defining neoliberalism, Ste-
ger and Roy (2010) state that the ideology emphasizes individual empowerment and that 
central state power should be cut into smaller units with political governance at the same 
time being minimized. This description fits well with the general description Olafsson 
(2003) proposed as being the main characteristics of  Icelanders, having a strong sense 
of  individualism and independence and resenting central authority. 
To provide an answer to how this transformed Icelandic society on a particular di-
mensional level, while other dimensions did not necessary change, it is worthwhile tak-
ing a quick look at Iceland´s banking history in relation to its society and how it quickly 
transformed, changing not only the financial landscape alone but also the societal struc-
ture. One of  Hofstede’s assumptions in his cultural comparisons is that despite cultures 
gradually changing, they usually do so only during a long period of  time (Hofstede et 
al. 2010). The period since the early 1990s may, however, be an exception to such an 
assumption. We propose that ideological forces of  market efficiency sweeping most of  
the globe during the period from the 1980s onwards, gaining full steam following the 
fall of  the Berlin Wall, had unequal effects on nations depending on their perceptions 
of  individualism. 











financial liberalization in 1995, with many of  the state´s assets being sold, including the 
three main banks. After having been localized institutions and operating under the rule 
of  political parties in a restricted environment since 1930, the sudden change in the 
Icelandic financial landscape opened doors for massive profits, but also little experience 
of  the associated risks. Icelandic banks had historically been very centralized. Instead 
of  banks being set up for purely business practices, as was done in 1904 when the 
first commercial bank was established by Danish investors (Jonsson 2009), banks were 
almost solely established by collective groups and areas, which was reflected in their 
names like the Agricultural Bank (Búnaðarbanki Íslands), the Icelandic Bank of  Com-
merce (Verzlunarbanki Íslands) and the Savings Bank of  Engineers (Sparisjóður vélstjóra). 
Many state companies were sold during the 1990s, among them the three major national 
banks. Institutions became thus less “collective” and more “individualistic” with the 
focus changing from providing customers services, to increasing profits, with the names 
of  banks no longer being localized to groups (most of  the smaller banks established 
by collective groups were, in 1990, merged into Íslandsbanki) and savings banks mostly 
using acronyms (Savings Bank of  Hafnarfjordur became for example known as SPH) as 
opposed to their names reflecting the local constituency they traditionally served (Lofts-
dóttir & Mixa 2014). Berg (1998) points out that in an economic environment where 
liberalization within banking is taking place, as occurred in the Nordic nations during 
the 1980s, banks lose their monopolistic powers and the interest rate spread decreases, 
leading to a contraction in profits. Banks in the Nordic region, as is common under such 
circumstances (for example Iceland during the Manic Millennium years), began swell-
ing the balance sheet to keep profits increasing but had little experience of  the associ-
ated risks. Additionally, Icelanders became, during the latter part of  the 1990s, suddenly 
wired to the world of  media and finance with the use of  the internet, the lower cost of  
international phone calls and the international live broadcasting of  television stations 
such as CNBC. There was even the opportunity to invest in international financial mar-
kets via internet.
As the rise in Icelandic stock market prices prior to the bust in 2008 indicates, there 
was a perceived sense of  phenomenal success due to the massive growth in the banking 
and financial sector. The public believed that Icelandic bankers were among the best in 
the world, despite the fact that modernized banking in Iceland was in reality only a few 
years old and as Thorvaldsson (2009), a former banker at Kaupthing bank, describes, 
had learned the basics of  investment banking only a few years earlier.  
One of  the typical anatomies Shiller (2001) suggests being among the precipitating 
factors of  a financial bubble, one that Iceland and the United States had in common 
during the recent financial bubble build-up (Mixa 2009, 436), is the expansion of  de-
fined contribution pension plans. Danielsson (2012) concludes that the increase of  such 
plans in Iceland may have contributed to Icelanders’ lesser needs in setting aside money 
for the future, but in a contradictory way people seem to save even less on the whole 
(or put another way, spend more than they set aside in savings) than before. Dumenil 
and Levy (2011, 143-155) contend that where neoliberal influences are rampant, more 
leverage is prevalent with the savings ratio falling ever more. This may explain why 
dimensional indicators diverge from financial ones in explaining the behavior of  sav-
ings and risk appetite among nations. By looking at savings ratios of  nations with the 
highest individualistic scores from Hofstede’s dimensional studies, it becomes apparent 
that such nations have in common very low savings ratios that tend to have decreased 
further concomitantly as neoliberal influences have grown. While Hondroyiannis (2006, 
556-557) summarizes studies showing that the private savings ratio falls within nations 
following financial liberalization, the savings ratio in Iceland was already below the aver-
age of  other Nordic nations when the liberalization of  its banking system began. There-
fore, it simply increased following the financial liberalization, just as other individualistic 
nations saw their savings ratio decline more than other nations following the financial 
liberalization of  allowing investment banking becoming part of  the commercial banking 
business model.
The Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study of  the effects of  banking liber-
alization concludes that the fragility of  the banking sector increases when certain fac-
tors are not in place, among which is a low level of  corruption. They contend that the 
fragility of  the banking sector tends to surface not immediately after a liberalization 
process begins but a few years later (ibid, 4), warning that financial liberalization should 
be approached cautiously. There was, however, little caution associated with the Icelan-
dic financial liberalization. The swift changes of  Iceland´s financial institutions enabled 
many to become rich rather quickly. Arnason (2015, 48-49) points out that while there 
may have been a tendency among Icelanders to blame the crash on a handful of  local 
bankers, the success stories of  the Icelandic banks, often largely fabricated, were part 
of  an image-making machine. Arnason further asks who should have resisted such pro-
cesses, as opposed to guarding the public interests. Gylfason (2012, 9) points out that 
many Icelandic politicians owed the banks enormous amounts of  money, with 10 out of  
63 members of  parliament owing the banks more than the equivalence of  one million 
euros each, with campaign donations per person in the Icelandic 2006 elections being 
14 times as much as the 2008 US campaign donations. The comparison is even more 
interesting in light of  the fact that the financial sector donates the highest campaign 
contributions than any other sector in the US (Johnson & Kwak 2011). Many politicians 
participated in glorifying the invented rhetoric of  Iceland´s banks success stories, seeing 
it, for example, in some way related to the (independent) Viking spirit of  the Icelandic 
bankers (Loftsdottir 2010), where “the economic adventure was seen […] as a joint pro-
ject of  Iceland and Icelanders, reflecting the national Icelandic character as such, rather 
than the success of  a few men who had joined the ranks of  global elite.” (Loftsdóttir 
2015, 7). 
This was easily carried out since most of  the media was owned by the same own-
ers as the banks or their main associates, sending constant messages amplifying such 
perceptions (Askelsdottir 2009). Arnason (2015, 51) points out that the authorities that 
facilitated the growth of  the Icelandic banks stood paralyzed once the horrific effects 











contribute to the event (ibid, 59). A feedback loop within Iceland´s society was thus 
created, to an extent based on merits of  strong individualism, where success stories 
were re-affirmed within banks, while the bankers had hardly any investment banking 
experience, as described by Thorvaldsson (2009). This corresponds to what Davies and 
McGoey (2012) term ‘rational ignorance,’ where agents in the financial markets may 
make ignorant decisions that may be beneficial in the short run but eventually causing 
disaster, hence having enough knowledge to promote growth but not enough knowl-
edge to take responsibility.
These sudden changes in the financial arena, coupled with other social transforma-
tions (such as the internet and thus connecting to a wider media world), may explain 
why Iceland´s value system has swayed more in line with value systems of  the United 
States and the United Kingdom - nations that have historically had a financial system 
tied to stock markets with a total market capitalization among the highest in the world 
(World Bank Database 2015). While it cannot be determined whether it was by default 
or design, Icelanders were nurtured in enabling the banks to grow to levels that obvi-
ously entailed great risks the Icelandic nation bore to a large extent. A lesson learned is 
that nations with a high degree of  individualism may be more apt to financial disasters 
when liberalizing their financial system; and not only because of  their financial behav-
ior but also because they may be more likely to accept success stories that often occur 
during the first years following liberalization and continue on a reckless financial path. 
Thus, instead of  heeding Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache´s warnings (1998) regard-
ing the dangers associated with financial liberalization, the Icelandic nation collectively 
championed risky banking business.
5. Conclusion
Sectorial features (bankers and their risky behavior) were in Iceland (and generally 
world-wide) more or less in line with predominant cultural values in conjunction with 
neoliberal policies, which we show in this paper has links and even re-enforcing effects 
on increased individualism. Although the sense of  individualism world-wide is difficult 
to measure, since it is relative between nations rather than an absolute number, financial 
indicators such as the savings ratio appears to provide clues of  cultural behavior on both 
a relative scale between nations and absolute scale regarding general cultural trends for 
certain areas. With elements such as increased flow of  communication (cheaper phone 
rates and the internet) and the fall of  the Berlin Wall implying a victory of  Capitalism 
over Communism, the western world was ripe for a sudden transformation often as-
sociated with financial bubbles. The Icelandic nation, having lived relatively isolated for 
many years due to its geographical location, was certainly riper than most other nations 
to such international trends and very likely changed much more rapidly than assumed 
in Hofstede’s work. 
This change, although unusually sudden, is not an anomaly. History shows that the 
definition of  culture has often been intertwined with economic developments, such as 
Adam Smith noted when writing The Wealth of  Nations, not merely describing economic 
concepts but more in a sense the cultural developments he was witnessing within a 
society quickly transforming into a market economy on the brink of  the industrial revo-
lution (Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011). Icelandic society, including its banking culture, 
transformed in a few years from being almost purely domestically focused to becoming 
highly international oriented. 
It could thus be argued that the high degree of  individualism within Icelandic society 
increased the likelihood of  it blindly embracing new opportunities within the financial 
sector. Culture by itself  certainly does not, however, explain why such a large part of  
the population went along. There were major changes within Iceland´s financial institu-
tions that quickly changed people´s attitudes that cannot be ascribed to some core values 
within the Icelandic culture. The effects of  the relationship between the general culture 
and sectorial features within it, especially in relation to finance, need further studies to 
show potential links of  the interplay of  culture and financial issues. Such studies must 
take into account other factors such as the long history of  political and economic isola-
tion (Sigurjonsson, Schwartzkopf  & Arnardottir 2011) that are beyond the scope of  this 
paper.
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